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LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORICAL 
MATERIALISM 
Johann J. Hagen* 
I 
In the science of law, legal sociology emerged as a matter of 
necessity. A legal system of simple conditions, characteristic of the 
early bourgeois society, could keep pace with the development of 
capitalism only by changing its nature. These changes took place in 
correspondence with the conditions of development of particular 
countries with different forms and different tempos. Whereas in the 
United States the "natural-law" period came to an end after the 
Civil War, 1 in Germany natural law was introduced by jurisprud-
ence of interests and by the free-law movement.2 It was interrupted 
by Hitlerian fascism, so that legal sociology established itself rela-
tively late in the German universities. This development has in 
every case a cogency; it imports the loss of "normative autonomy,"3 
that is, a gradual dissolution of the entire closed order of principles, 
concepts and rules. Legal sociology was born out of the crisis oflaw, 
which is actually the crisis of bourgeois society. 4 The breakdown of 
a "legal world outlook"5 forced legal science to occupy itself with the 
facts behind legal conceptions. 6 
The problems involved in these developments assume a central 
place in Julius Stone's work on legal sociology.7 In his search for a 
link between all factors having "social dimensions" that determine 
* Professor in Legal Sociology and Procedural Law, Salzburg University; Dr. Jur., 
Innsbruck. 
1. See R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); N. REICH, SOCIOLOGICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE UND LEGAL REALISM IM RECHTSDENKEN AMERIKAS (1967). 
2. See J. EDELMANN, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER INTERESSENJURISPRUDENZ (1967); K. RIEBSCH-
LAGER, DIE FREIRECHTSBEWEGUNG (1967). 
3. See Hagen, Die Desintegration von Recht und Gesellschaft, in ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 
RECHTSPOLITIK 81 (1971); Kramer, Die Relevanz Gesellschaftlicher Wertungen im Obligati-
onenrecht, in DIMENSIONEN DES RECHTS: GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FUR REN~ MARCIC 119-20 (M. 
Fischer ed. 1974). 
4. See J. HAGEN, SozIOLOGIE UND JURISPRUDENZ: ZuR DIALEKTIK VON GESELLSCHAFT UND 
RECHT 168 (1973). 
5. See Engels & Kautsky, Juristen-Sozialismus, 21 K. MARX & F. ENGEL, WERKE 491 
(1972) [series hereinafter cited as M.E.W.]. 
6. See P. NEDBAILO, EINFt'.JHRUNG IN DIE ALLGEMEINE THEORIE DES STAATES UND DES RECHTS 
79 (1972). 
7. See, e.g., inaugural lecture by J. Stone, Law in the Modern State (Auckland Univer-
sity College, 1939). 
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the nature of law, he could not fail to come across the conceptions 
of Marxism-Leninism and its theory of society-historical material-
ism.8 Dealing with this theory was unavoidable, because the general 
claim of historical materialism to ascertain the comprehensive 
connections between society, history, economy, law and politics 
collides with the theoretical interests of Stone. Generally, it can be 
said that the essential problems are identical; they both present 
themselves with a certain logical and historical necessity. In answer-
ing them, however, different standpoints become manifest. Thus 
Stone, in spite of an essentially similar approach to the problems, 
could not accept the central tenets of historical materialism. It must 
be acknowledged that Stone has paid a great deal of attention to 
Marxist-Leninist conceptions of the state and law and that he has 
done this in a manner quite remarkable for an author of Anglo-
Saxon legal background. In this article I propose to carry further his 
discussion on the present topic and I shall attempt to go into some 
further related matters. Thus, a different light may be thrown on 
the problems at issue. 
II 
The conception of law as propounded by historical materialism 
requires the consideration that law is not simply an ideology of 
"class-society" and a mere economic reflex.9 The scientific recogni-
tion of the significance of economic factors in the total societal 
process belongs certainly to the work of Marx and Engels. N everthe-
less, it is not feasible to characterize this conception of society and 
history as "economic determinism." 10 In idealistic philosophy, 
which had achieved its consummation in Hegel, the conditions of 
human existence could be represented only as products of the un-
foiding of the spirit; the state and law could be explained, as it 
were, out of themselves. Historical materialism developed an appro-
priate orientation toward the relevant problems through disputa-
tions relating to these positions. The result of this process of thought 
is summarized by Marx in the following celebrated passage in the 
preface to his Critique of Political Economy: 
Men enter into determinate necessary conditions which are inde-
pendent of their will-into production-relations that correspond to 
8. See J . STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 475, 490-515, 579-86 (1966). 
9. Cf. id. at 509. 
10. Id. at 579-86. 
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the stage of development of the material productive forces. The 
totality of these production-relations constitutes the economic 
structure of the society, the real basis on which a legal and political 
superstructure rests and which corresponds to certain societal forms 
of consciousness. The method of production relating to material life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual process of life in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
"Being" but the other way around. The societal being determines 
their consciousness. 11 
105 
This statement does not provide an answer to all relevant ques-
tions but only to the "basic problem of philosophy," namely, the 
question as to the fundamental relation between the factors of 
societal-historical process. 12 It is the task of social sciences to explore 
the concrete ideological, political, and legal forms in which material 
conditions express themselves. Engels himself has pointed out that 
as long as this does not happen, historical materialism is a mere 
phrase. 
Our historical conception ... is above all a lead-in to a study, no 
leader a la Hegel [sic]. The whole history must be studied anew. 
The conditions of different formations of society must be examined 
in detail before attempt is to be made to derive political, private-
law, ethical, philosophical, religious and so on conceptions from 
them which would correspond to them. 13 
In this framework legal sociology, if properly understood, has an 
important and necessary function. The explanation of legal regula-
tions as economic reflexes would be quite inadequate; it is necessary 
to analyze also their comprehensive historical, sociological, ideologi-
cal and economic connections. From the standpoint of Marxism-
Leninism, it is not possible to justify in this area any simplification 
such as the thesis of economic determinism imports. One should 
remember here, the short but instructive statements of Marx con-
cerning the evolution of the right to make wills. By these state-
ments, half a century before Eugen Erlich,1'' he anticipates the con-
ception of mutual connection between family, way of life, forms of 
11. 13 M.E.W. 7, 8-9 (1964). 
12. See Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen 
Philosophie, 21 M.E.W. 261, 274 (1972). 
13. Letter from F. Engels to Conrad Schmidt, Aug. 5, 1890, in 37 M .E.W. 435, 436-37 
(1967) . 
14. On his ideas concerning the development of the law of succession, see E. EHRLICH, 
GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS 89, 184 (3d ed. 1967). 
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production, societal conditions, religion and the law of succession. 15 
It becomes plain that legal sociology based on historical materialism 
must recognize the principle that a production and reproduction of 
real life is, in the last instance, a determining, but not the sole 
determining factor. Otherwise the proposition that societal being 
determines consciousness would be an empty and abstract, indeed 
absurd, statement. For: 
The economic situation is the basis, but different factors belonging 
to the superstructure-political forms of the class struggle and its 
result; constitutions established after the victorious class has won 
the battle, etc.; legal forms, especially the reflexes of the real 
struggle in the minds of the fighters; political, legal, philosophical 
theories, religious conceptions and their development into systems 
of dogmas-also influence the cause of historical struggles and de-
termine, in many cases preponderantly, their forms. It is by interac-
tion of all these factors, in which ultimately through all the infinite 
multiplicity of contingencies ... the economic course establishes 
itself as a necessity. 16 
The thesis of an "economic determinism" ignores also the im-
portance of dialectic in the social theory of Marxism-Leninism. Dia-
lectical and historical materialism constitute an inseparable unity .17 
Scientific socialism is to be understood not only as an overhaul and 
as an overthrow of philosophical idealism but also of mechanical 
materialism oriented only to natural sciences. The transfer of pro-
gressive methods of natural sciences to the domain of society is 
possible only with the aid of dialectics. If social sciences should 
make any sense at all, they must assume that social phenomena too, 
follow objective regularities. However, in contrast to the laws of 
nature these regularities are actualized in the conduct of men.18 
Their cognition and recognition is a prerequisite of conscious forma-
tion of societal relations; ignoring them has the consequence that 
they become effective in a spontaneous manner "behind the back" 
of the members of society .19 
Thus Engels stated in the context of the free-trade debate: 
15. Letter from K. Marx to Ferdinand LaSalle, July 22, 1861, in 30 M.E.W. 613 (1964). 
See also Marx, Debatten uber das Holzdiebstahlsgesetz, 1 M.E.W. 109 (1972). 
16. Letter from F. Engels to Joseph Bloch, Sept. 21, 1890, in 37 M.E.W. 462, 463 (1967). 
17. See Muller, Historischer Materialismus und Objektivitat der okonomischen Gesetze 
des Sozialismus, in DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PHILOSOPHIE 930 (1973). 
18. See J . HAGEN, RATIONALES ENTSCHEIDEN 95 (1974). 
19. See Lenin, Was sind die "Volksfreunde" und wie kampfen sie gegen die Sozialde-
mokratie?, 1 W.I. LENIN, WERKE 129 (1961). 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 9
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/9
1975] Sociology and Materialism 
All governments, independent as they may be, are ultimately only 
the executors of economic necessities of the national situation. They 
may make provisions for this task in various ways-well, badly, or 
tolerably; they may accelerate or impede the economic develop-
ment and its political and legal consequences; but finally they must, 
nevertheless, follow them. 20 
107 
Since in all developed industrial states legal norms rest on 
political decisions, nothing else can obtain effectiveness in the do-
main of law. Legal sociology also plays an important social role in 
the formulation of sociological premises for decisions by legislative 
authorities. 21 
III 
Stone places Marxism-Leninism on the same line with the doc-
trines of Comte, Spencer, Duguit and anarchism. He argues that 
all of them denied, in one way or another, the distinct identity of 
law. 22 This conception is consistent with the assumption of an "eco-
nomic determinism." However, it requires rectification. Bourgeois 
legal sociology also thrives on the assumption that the legal system 
has no independent existence. However, as Stone aptly observes, 
the fact that law is socially conditioned does not exclude the recog-
nition of its independent existence. 23 As for Marxism-Leninism, it 
proceeds from the conception of multifarious connections between 
social phenomena and speaks at the same time of a relative inde-
pendence of law. 24 The divergencies concern then only the roles of 
the state and of law. 
The ostensible inconsistency between the active role of politics 
and law on the one hand, and the social independence of both on 
the other, can be understood only dialectically. Legal norms are not 
only economic reflexes, or passive products of societal conditions, 
but in their turn exercise an effect upon the formation of these 
conditions. In cybernetic terms, a process of feed-back is in opera-
20. Letter from F. Engels to Nikolai Franzewitsch Danielson, July 18, 1892, in 38 
M.E.W. 363, 365 (1968). 
21. See Kazimir~uk, Tumanov & Steijnberg, Law and Sociological Studies in US.S.R., 
in NORMS AND ACTIONS: NATIONAL REPORTS ON SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 80 (R. Treves & J. van Loon 
eds. 1968). 
22. Stone makes a distinction between the denial of the present existence of law on the 
one hand, and law's necessity for the future on the other. See J. STONE, supra note 8, at 473. 
23. Id. at 472-73. 
24. See Bratus et al., Marxistisch-Leninistische allgemeine Theorie des Staates und des 
Rechts, 1 GRUNDLEGENDE INSTITUTE UNO BEGRIFFE 294 (1974). 
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tion. The real situation is, indeed, the primum agens, but the "ideal 
area," e.g., law and legal consciousness, "exercise in their turn a 
reacting and a secondary influence" on the societal conditions.25 The 
historically conditioned separation of production forces and produc-
tion relations characteristic of capitalist society repeats itself in the 
divergence of societal and legal development. In the period of capi-
talism, the legal development is dominated by immanent factors 
which produce an illusion of a legal world of and in itself. 26 Engels 
characterizes this development as follows: 
As soon as the new division of labour, which creates professional 
lawyers, becomes necessary, a new autonomous field is opened 
up-a field which, in spite of its general dependence upon produc-
tion and commerce, nevertheless possesses also a special capability 
of reaction against these areas. In a modern State law must not only 
correspond to the general economic situation, must not only be its 
expression, but it must also be an expression coherent in itself, one 
which does not slap back into its own face because of inner contra-
dictions. In order to manage this the reflection of economic relations 
ceases more and more to be a faithful one. And the more rarely it 
happens that a book of statutes is a crude, unmitigated, and unadul-
terated expression of the dominion of a class; this would itself be 
indeed against the "concept of law" .. . Thus the process of the 
"development of law" consists primarily in the attempt to remove 
the contradictions which result from the direct translation of eco-
nomic relations into legal principles and to establish a harmonious 
legal system. Then, however, the influence and the compulsion of 
further economic development breaks down this system again and 
again and enwraps it in new contradictions.27 
It is precisely this aprioristic "absolutization" of legal princi-
ples which produces in the minds of men a false consciousness moti-
vating practical behaviour. This interpretation of ideological and 
economic factors is again illustrated by Engels with an example 
from the law of succession: 
On the assumption of the same stage of development of the family, 
the law of succession has an economic foundation. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to show that, for example, the absolute freedom in mak-
ing wills in England and the strong limitation of making wills in 
25. Letter from F. Engels to Conrad Schmidt, June 12, 1889, in 37 M.E.W. 236 (1967). 
26. See M. WEBER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 331 (1967) . 
27. Letter from F. Engels to Conrad Schmidt, Oct. 27, 1890, in 37 M.E.W. 488, 491 
(1967) . 
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France would have only economic reasons for all details . But in a 
very significant way both have in their turn an effect on the economy 
by influencing the distribution of property.28 
109 
It thus appears that dialectical and historical materialism and its 
conception of law are as far removed from "legal nihilism" as they 
are from the conception of normative autonomy. 
The characterization of the nature of law, as well as of its place 
in the general social context, is of decisive significance for the con-
tent of legal science and above all for its relation to social sciences.29 
From the standpoint of historical materialism neither the dissolu-
tion of legal science in social science nor the establishment of legal 
sociology as a discipline separate from legal science is an adequate 
solution. Legal science conceived as a social science imports a denial 
of the distinct identity of law, which is inconsistent with the 
Marxist-Lennist conception of law. The social character of law can 
be realized only by preserving completely its independent role 
within the framework of the general theory of law. An independent 
legal sociology would deprive legal science of its proper content and 
of its theoretical foundation. 30 But naturally, many problems that 
emerge here must still remain open, and this is the reason why a 
continuation of a dialogue between legal sociology and historical 
materialism, as was here attempted, is necessary and beneficial. 
28. Id. at 492. 
29. On this point see Sieling, Juristenausbildung in Bremen, in DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT 
63 (1974). 
30. P. NEDBAILO, supra note 6, at 81. 
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